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Sign in to use this feature. About us. Editorial team. This article has no associated abstract. First, the depiction says nothing about the strength of moral motivation. For all that it tells us, the motivation all or some people feel to do what they judge right might be extraordinarily weak.
Common experience suggests that moral motivation in fact tends to be fairly robust, but with one qualification to be noted later, philosophical views about moral motivation generally follow the depiction in taking no position regarding the exact strength of moral motivation. Second, the depiction reflects a widely shared assumption, one which forms part of the backdrop for debates about the nature of moral motivation, namely, that moral motivation is a strikingly regular and reliable phenomenon.
Throughout social life, in both our personal relations and our public interactions, we take it for granted that moral judgments dependably, if not unfailingly, motivate, that they effectively influence and guide how people feel and act. Still, the assumption is not wholly uncontroversial; indeed, some have expressed serious doubts regarding whether moral motivation is as regular and reliable as we commonly suppose Copp , The basic phenomenon of moral motivation seems relatively straightforward.
The difficult philosophical task becomes one of attempting to understand and explain more fully and precisely the nature of moral motivation. Sections 2 and 3 explore two approaches to the task. While the approach discussed in section 3 has been predominant, the approach to be considered briefly in section 2 provides an instructive contrast, as well as a useful first glimpse of how ideas about moral motivation have been thought to bear on broader metaethical questions. Section 4 explores more general considerations about moral motivation and metaethics, while section 5 considers alleged implications for philosophical theories about moral motivation from recent work in empirical psychology.
When we judge that an action is right or wrong or that a state of affairs is good or bad, we seem to represent the world as being a certain way. We seem to express a moral belief, attributing a particular moral property or normative characteristic to the action or state of affairs. Taking the apparent representational form of moral judgments as our lead, we might try to explain moral motivation by appealing to the nature of the properties that figure in our moral judgments.
Perhaps we are reliably motivated by our moral judgments, at least when those judgments are roughly correct, because moral properties like rightness and goodness themselves motivate us, when we apprehend them.
Mackie famously criticizes this picture of moral properties in his extended argument against the objectivity of ethics. Mackie claims to find something like it in the work of a number of historical figures, including Kant and Sidgwick, but his clearest presentation of the picture comes in his remarks about Plato. They are a very central structural element in the fabric of the world. The philosopher-kings in the Republic can, Plato thinks, be trusted with unchecked power because their education will have given them knowledge of the Forms.
Apprehension of these properties move an agent to act, and to do so unaided by any additional source of motivation; their motivational power depends on no desire or disposition of the individual herself.
Second, apprehension of moral properties not only motivates on its own: it provides overriding motivation. Once an agent does apprehends them, their motivating power overcomes any opposing desires or inclinations. According to existence internalism, a necessary connection exists between having a certain normative status and motivation.
Consider a view about reasons associated most prominently with Bernard Williams According to what is called internalism about reasons or reasons internalism , necessarily, if an individual has a reason to do an action, he must be able to be motivated to do that action. According to Mackie, the motivating power of objective values, if there were such values, would have to be just as Plato depicted it.
So moral cognitivism —the view that moral judgments and beliefs, and the sentences that express them, can be true or false—provides the correct account of moral semantics, of what our moral judgments mean. Given that our moral discourse is cognitivist , it would seem to presume the correctness of moral realism , the view, roughly, that moral judgments and beliefs are truth evaluable, and some of them are literally true.
Talk about morality is, Mackie evidently thinks, rather like talk about unicorns. But there are no such creatures, and so our unicorn talk is systematically in error, though few of us any longer succumb to the error.
In denying the existence of moral properties, Mackie rejects moral realism, combining a cognitivist moral semantics with an error theory. And most have rejected efforts to explain moral motivation by appealing to a motivating power emanating from moral properties and the acts and states of affairs that instantiate them. One partial exception to this last claim may be worth noting. Christine Korsgaard has endorsed the idea of something like objectively prescriptive entities, though these entities are not, in her view, moral properties.
Whether or not there are any properties or entities with anything like the powers Mackie describes, it is a mistake to suppose that moral realists and objectivists must be committed to their existence.
No realist or objectivist need think that moral properties, or facts about their instantiation, will, when apprehended, be sufficient to motivate all persons regardless of their circumstances, including their cognitive and motivational makeup. An individual might grasp a moral fact, for example, but suffer from temporary irrationality or weakness of will; she might be free of such temporary defects but possess a more indelible motivational makeup that impedes or defeats the motivating power of moral facts.
Any plausible account of moral motivation will, and must, acknowledge these sources of motivational failure; and any plausible analysis of moral properties must allow for them. Even those realists or objectivists who maintain that all rational and motivationally unimpaired persons will be moved by moral facts need not think they will be overridingly indefeasibly motivated.
As already noted, regardless of their views with respect to broader metaethical questions, contemporary philosophers do not take any position on the precise strength of moral motivation—with the qualification alluded to earlier that they reject, apparently universally, the idea that moral motivation is ordinarily overriding. Philosophers have most often attempted to explain moral motivation not by appealing to the special powers of moral properties but by appealing to the nature of moral judgments.
Perhaps moral judgments are such that no person could sincerely judge an act morally right or a state of affairs good, while remaining wholly unmoved. Efforts to understand moral motivation in terms of motivation by moral judgments must confront two central questions. First, what is the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation—do moral judgments motivate necessarily or do they motivate only contingently? Second, can moral judgments motivate on their own or can they motivate only by the intermediation of a desire or other conative state?
Of course, philosophers have answered these questions in varying ways. Now one way in which moral judgments could motivate, and, indeed, motivate on their own, would be if moral judgments were not representational after all. Suppose moral judgments did not ascribe properties and express moral beliefs about what things have those properties.
They simply express a motivating state that the individual already has; to make a sincere moral judgment is already to be motivated, at least to some degree. The real puzzle as to how moral judgments can motivate arises for those who maintain that moral judgments express moral beliefs , for the connection between belief, a cognitive state, and motivation is uncertain.
How philosophers resolve the puzzle turns on a central issue in moral psychology, namely, whether what is called the Humean theory of motivation is true. According to the Humean view, belief is insufficient for motivation, which always requires, in addition to belief, the presence of a desire or conative state.
Moral motivation thus cannot arise from moral belief alone but must depend as well upon a preexisting desire or other conative or intrinsically motivating state. It would perhaps be fair to say that Humeanism continues to be the dominant view. It has been held both by some who accept and by some who reject cognitivism and moral realism, so it has not alone been considered decisive in settling broader issues in metaethics. The view has been held by noncognitivist anti-realists, for example, but also by moral realists like Michael Smith and Peter Railton a.
A number of prominent philosophers, including Thomas Nagel , John McDowell , Mark Platts , David McNaughton , Jonathan Dancy , Thomas Scanlon , and Russ Shafer-Landau , have rejected the Humean picture, however, arguing that, in fact, moral motivation does not depend on the existence of desire: moral belief can itself give rise to motivation. Precisely how and under what conditions moral belief can itself motivate is a matter of dispute among anti-Humeans.
Some hold that moral belief is sufficient to motivate directly. Merely believing that it is right, say, to keep a promise will move the believer, at least to some degree, to act so as to keep the promise. Others hold that moral beliefs produce desires, which then motivate in conjunction with the moral beliefs that produced them.
Believing that it is right to keep a promise produces a desire to do so, and these cognitive and conative states jointly move the believer, at least to some degree, to act so as to keep the promise.
Certain virtue theorists offer a quite refined version of the latter idea, arguing that only a particular type of moral belief—one tied to an ideal or complete conception of a situation in light of a more expansive understanding of how to live—necessarily generates in an individual the motivation to do as a moral belief of that type indicates she ought Little ; McDowell The virtuous person has not mere moral beliefs but a complex of moral belief and outlook which will reliably move her to behave morally.
Proponents of various anti-Humean views readily acknowledge that persons often fail to be moved and to act as they believe they ought. According to any of these views, however, a failure of motivation springs from a cognitive failure. As already noted, many have found the basic Humean picture most plausible.
Before examining a few of the considerations thought to favor it, we should make note of the fact that Humeanism does not itself commit one to any particular view as to the sorts of desires responsible for moral motivation. A Humean might well take the view that no particular desire is implicated in moral motivation.
On the contrary, varying desires may, when contingently present, move an individual to do what she judges she ought to do, including the desire to be well regarded by her neighbors, to advance her interests in some way, or to promote the welfare of those who matter to her. Appealing simply to some contingent desire or other may be inadequate, however, to explain the basic phenomenon of moral motivation.
After all, what needs to be explained, many would argue, is not merely how we may, on occasion or even frequently, be motivated to do as we think we ought: what needs to be explained is how we are reliably motivated to do as we think we ought.
That includes explaining why motivation reliably shifts so as to track changes in our moral beliefs. As we will see, those who accept the Humean picture have sometimes suggested that we look to quite particular desires or to deep features of human psychology to explain moral motivation.
One argument in favor of the Humean picture alleges that if beliefs were sufficient to motivate, then we would expect people with the same beliefs to be motivated in the same way. In fact, however, whereas some people are motivated by their moral belief, say, that contributing to famine relief is a duty, to write a check to Oxfam, others feel no such inclination whatsoever.
But anti-Humeans claim that they can explain away these differences by showing either that differential motivation is in fact due to other differences in belief or to motives that compete with and override the desires generated by moral beliefs Shafer-Landau , — A second argument in favor of Humeanism appeals to the view about reasons associated with Williams , briefly discussed earlier.
Recall that according to internalism about reasons or reasons internalism, it is necessarily the case that if an individual has a reason to do an action, then he must be able to be motivated to do that action. On a more specific version of the view, an individual has a reason to do an action only if he has a desire to perform that action or to achieve some end that requires doing that action.
If internalism about reasons is correct, then when an individual correctly judges himself to have a reason to perform an action, he must already have a preexisting desire. Anti-Humeans sometimes reject reasons internalism, as well as the Humean theory of motivation. But even allowing that reasons internalism is correct, they believe this second argument fails to undermine their position. For it seems possible that not all of our moral judgments involve the judgment correct or otherwise that we have a reason for action.
An individual could, for example, judge that it would be right to fulfill a promise without judging that she has a reason to do anything. What might explain this? Perhaps, for instance, she fails to reflect on the connection between what it is right to do and what one has reason to do; or perhaps she mistakenly believes that truths about morally right action do not entail truths about what one has reason to do. Perhaps the most sophisticated argument in favor of the Humean theory of motivation appeals to considerations in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, specifically, to fundamental differences between belief and desire that would seem to count against anti-Humeanism.
They differ in such a way, it would seem, that belief states cannot entail desire states. Whereas beliefs aim to fit the world, desires aim to change the world.
For a mental state to count as a belief, it must be at least somewhat responsive to evidence that bears on the truth or falsity of its propositional content; that the facts are contrary to a belief counts against it. In contrast, facts contrary to the propositional content of a desire—the fact that the world is not currently as one wants—need not count against that desire. Precisely because desires aim not to answer to the world but to make the world answer to them to make the world fit their propositional contents or what the desires are desires for , they may well persist even when the world refuses to cooperate.
Assuming the foregoing claims about belief and desire are true, so the argument goes, at least some versions of anti-Humeanism would require what is incoherent, namely, mental states with incompatible directions of fit: mental states that could be at once representational in the way that beliefs are and motivational in the way that desires are.
But anti-Humeans would argue that their picture of moral motivation via moral belief need involve no incoherence. Anti-Humeans have offered various considerations—some positive, others negative—to support their rejection of Humeanism. On the negative side, they attempt to defeat considerations thought to favor the Humean theory, as we have already seen in the course of exploring some of those considerations.
On the positive side, Anti-Humeans sometimes appeal to the phenomenology of moral motivation, arguing that it supports their view.
Ask the agent who is sorely tempted to do otherwise why he ultimately acted as he believed morality required and he will not report his desires at the moment of action; rather, he will explain that he believed the action was the right thing to do Shafer-Landau , Our own experience and that of others tells us that although our actions often arise from our desires, sometimes they arise instead from our evaluative beliefs.
As further support for these claims about the phenomenology of moral motivation, Shafer-Landau has appealed to nonmoral cases in which motivation seems to follow from belief.
Consider the individual who convinces herself that she has a desire she in fact lacks, such as the desire to become a lawyer. She enrolls in law school only to find herself unmotivated by her coursework and dropping out of school, after a summer spent working as a carpenter reveals her love of carpentry Shafer-Landau , Given that many of our choices will involve subjecting ourselves to tedious, even painful, experiences—experiences that surely none of us desire for their own sake—the Humean owes us some explanation of our willingness to persist in such choices.
The Humean will, it seems, be forced to appeal to some further desire we thereby seek to satisfy, such as, in the case of the law school drop-out, the desire to become a lawyer. But such an explanation will be implausible in cases in which we are mistaken about our desires. No compelling reason can be given to accept a desire-based explanation of our actions, Shafer-Landau argues, over the more straightforward explanation in terms of our beliefs.
Leaving that argument to one side, however, neither the phenomenology of moral motivation nor cases in which individuals are mistaken about their desires support the anti-Humean view. The fact that an individual may cite a belief rather than a desire in explaining why she did what she judged to be right does nothing to show either that her moral belief directly moved her to act or that it generated a desire that moved her to act.
Individual self-reports are notoriously unreliable and can hardly settle so fundamental a question about moral psychology. As for cases in which individuals are allegedly mistaken about their desires, common sense suggests that the Humean has the more straightforward explanation. Once she experienced it, she lost her desire to continue her studies. Still, she was moved to enter law school not by her bare belief, but by a more deep seated, perhaps not fully conscious desire, such as the desire to please her parents or to have the prestige or pay that comes with being a lawyer.
Anti-Humeans have given us no reason to favor their explanation over the Humean alternatives. Of course, anti-Humeans need not think the phenomenology, as they suppose it to be, settles the dispute, but Humeans will insist that it does not even tend to favor the anti-Humean position.
The foregoing discussion does not, of course, cover every argument that has been offered in the longstanding debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans, just a few of the ones that philosophers have evidently found most persuasive. Whether and how the debate might be resolved remains uncertain, in part, because the nature of the dispute is rather unclear. Is it at bottom a conceptual dispute to be resolved, for instance, by analysis of the concepts of belief and desire? Perhaps, though arguments that appeal to considerations in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology have thus far proved less than fully convincing.
Is the dispute instead fundamentally empirical? The tendency to appeal to common sense and the phenomenology of moral action would seem to betray some temptation to treat the issue as at least partly empirical, though perhaps these appeals are meant to serve merely as a check on conceptual claims. Appeals to our experience can, in any case, be just as well, and just as inconclusively, invoked by those on either side of the debate.
In the context of warding off criticisms of the view that virtue is knowledge, Little suggests that the dispute is fundamentally theoretical, implicating large and complex questions about the nature of agency, normativity, and responsibility.
Whether or not that is so, Little may be right in suggesting that the dispute will not be resolvable by appeal to merely local arguments of the sort we have considered.
How plausible one finds either side may turn, in the end, on the plausibility of the larger theories in which these views respectively figure. Whatever one might conclude as to whether moral judgments or beliefs motivate on their own or only by means of some preexisting conative state, a question remains as to the precise nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation. Do moral judgments motivate necessarily or do they motivate only contingently?
If the latter, then how are we to explain why the contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation is as strong and reliable as it appears to be? The main division of opinion regarding the nature of the connection between moral judgment and motivation is between those philosophers who accept and those who reject a thesis known as motivational judgment internalism. This thesis is a form of judgment internalism.
Judgment internalism must be distinguished from the thesis of existence internalism, which we considered earlier. Recall that according to existence internalism, a necessary connection exists between having a certain normative status and motivation. Whereas judgment internalism states a necessary condition on being a judgment of a certain kind, existence internalism states a necessary condition on being an act or state or consideration of a certain normative kind.
Internalism can assume weaker or stronger forms. Thus, what objective moral properties must be like involves a rather extreme form of existence internalism, which would be allied with a rather extreme form of judgment internalism.
Contemporary moral philosophers have been no more attracted to so strong a claim when moral motivation is tied to moral judgment than they have been when moral motivation is tied to moral properties. Instead, they have accepted weaker forms of internalism, which allow that even though, necessarily, the person who makes a sincere moral judgment will feel some motivation to comply with it, that motivation can be overridden by conflicting desires and defeated by a variety of mental maladies, such as depression and weakness of will Svavarsdottir , sec.
As should already be evident, those who accept one or another form of motivational judgment internalism have a ready explanation of the reliability of moral motivation, including the reliability of motivational shifting so as to track changes in moral judgment. Indeed, one argument offered in favor of internalism is that only if we accept it can we plausibly explain why changes in moral motivation reliably follow upon changes in moral judgment Smith , 71— Suppose Jones and Thomson are debating the moral permissibility of abortion.
Jones is inclined to believe that abortion is morally wrong. She has been known to join the protest line outside of a local abortion clinic and to try to dissuade women from having abortions. Thomson, in contrast, believes that abortion is morally permissible. Suppose that after extensive discussion, Thomson convinces Jones that the more plausible arguments support the permissibility of abortion. Being rationally integrated would entail that the reasons which affect presents are not independent of the other things that a subject believes, desires, etc.
If so, then the way in which affect exerts rational pressure on the agent does not seem clearly distinct from the way in which any non-affective cognitions do so; rational pressure is enacted only after the affective and non-affective have been integrated. Thus appealing to R-Hedomotive fails to advance the Practicality debate. Morally Perceptive Hedomotive P-Hedomotive : Necessarily, if S is the subject of an occurrent affective moral mental episode that X, then S is motivated at least somewhat concerning X, if S is morally perceptive.
Moral perceptiveness admits of at least two relevant interpretations. First, moral perceptiveness may involve responding to moral scenarios by having affective moral episodes, in contradistinction to forming non-affective moral beliefs. Footnote 70 So construed, however, this view collapses into a version of U-Internalism restricted to affective judgments , and thus faces the same objections.
Second, moral perceptiveness may be a property of the virtuous agent, such that they perceive situations distinctively. So interpreted, we make three points. First, insofar as the virtuous agent is here taken to be presented with reasons, P-Hedomotive collapses into R-Hedomotive, and is above problematised.
This renders the view non-substantive. Third, and most immediately relevant, P-Hedomotive and P-Internalism are apparently neither more nor less plausible than their non-affective counterparts, i. We have argued that appealing to affect to vindicate a version of Internalism is problematic: at the very least, the resultant affective Internalisms are no less theoretically controversial and no more empirically supported than their non-affective counterparts.
The reader may wonder what connection we think does obtain between affect and motivation. In closing, consider:. Normalcy Hedomotive N-Hedomotive : Normally, if S is the subject of an occurrent affective mental episode that X, then she is motivated at least somewhat concerning X.
It certainly withstands our arguments. In support, note that we often intelligibly offer affective mental episodes as reasons for our actions, suggesting that affect is normally connected to motivation.
Although much more would need to be said in defence, N-Hedomotive is anyway too weak to support Internalism. An affective appeal vindicating Internalism requires more than a merely frequent, contingent connection between affect and motivation.
Indeed, notice that non-affective moral thoughts that X are also normally connected to motivation concerning X. In support, note that citing non-affective beliefs, perhaps non-affective moral beliefs in particular, as reasons for action is just as intelligible as citing affective episodes. So, even if true, N-Hedomotive is apparently neither more nor less controversial than a parallel claim about the connection between motivation and non-affective beliefs.
These same claims about affect, however, are also true of non-affective cognition. Little wonder that the Practicality debate continues. This may be avoided by requiring that a belief be accompanied by motivation to be classified as a moral belief.
See Tresan , esp. Brink Strandberg , esp. Smith , esp. For discussion see van Roojen , esp. See, e. Dreier , esp. Francen , esp. For examples of the former see footnotes 13— For the latter see works by C20th Emotivists like Charles Stevenson, and, more recently, Blackburn , esp, pp.
See his , section 4. Kauppinen and , esp. Zagzebski , esp. Dancy , esp. They seem no more of a capitulation to Externalism than more familiar non-affective Conditional Internalisms. We here charitably grant that extant versions of the affective appeal could support Internalism. See Aydede , esp. Beyond ethics and the philosophy of affect, our arguments have broader significance. Brady , esp. Morillo , esp. See also Dancy , p.
Hedomotive assumes that affective mental episodes have intentional content. Intentional accounts of affective mental episodes, particularly the affect of these episodes, are currently mainstream, e. As is standard, we take affect to be episodic.
This is consistent with the fact that some paradigmatically affective phenomena are sometimes realized not only episodically, but dispositionally, e. Bain , p. Zagzebski may be interpreted as endorsing Hedomotive, e. See Eggers , p. See Bain S for Hedomotive. In more recent work Bain , he includes experience-directed motivation, e. But experienced-directed motivation is the wrong kind of motivation for Internalists see sections 1.
Frijda See also Prinz p. Kauppinen , p. For discussion see Cohen and Fulkerson , esp. See Dennett , p. For a useful overview of the distinction see Drayson Corns Robinson and Berridge For elaboration, see again Corns For discussion see Barbano et al. On the former view, a single affective system is responsible for the full range of hedonic processing, e. See e. Reynolds et al. The latter view posits two distinct and independent affective processing systems, each involving mostly hedonically specialised neurons, areas, and neurochemicals.
Norman et al. Schultz and Waddell See Leknes and Tracey For some among many, see Bechtel , Piccinini, esp. See Kauppinen , esp. Jacobson , esp. Heathwood , esp. Space constrains our discussing non-moral dissociation cases in text, but we think they exist, e. Tresan , esp. Developing a suggestion by Eggers , section 5. This is anyway the same kind of dialectical controversy that predates the affective appeal.
Aydede and Fulkerson , esp. Kriegel , esp. Gendler An alternative view is that affect itself constitutes a reason for action. We worry that this either collapses into F-Hedomotive, or else only generates internally-directed reasons.
See also Kauppinen , esp. Brogaard and Chudnoff , esp. Reiland , esp. Sellars , esp. Goldman Silva , esp. Tolhurst , section 5. McDowell Necessarily, if S makes a moral judgment that X, then the moral judgment that X is appropriately connected to a motivating affective moral judgment concerning X.
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